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NOTES 
Limiting the Plaintiff Class: Rule I0b-5 and the Federal 
Securities Code 
The nation's largest railroad reached the end of the line on June 
21, 1970. On that date the Penn Central Transportation Company 
filed a petition for reorganization pursuant to section 77 of the 
Federal Bankruptcy Act.1 The collapse of the company caught many 
shareholders by surprise. Although the Penn Central Company on 
occasion had modified its corporate form,2 it had not missed paying 
a dividend for 123 years,3 and its securities sported prime ratings 
until the month before the bankruptcy.4 
Yet, not everyone was injured in the crash. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission's (SEC) report to Congress on the collapse of the 
Penn Central alleges that some corporate insiders dumped their per-
sonal holdings of Penn Central securities shortly before news of the 
company's financial distress reached the investing public.ti It was also 
alleged that insiders made these sales without disclosing material in-
formation regarding the company's approaching crisis, and that 
Penn Central's management issued unjustifiably optimistic reports 
to the public.6 It is not surprising that the "·wreck of the Penn 
Central" has generated considerable private litigation by share-
I. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). See Wall St. J., June 22, 1970, at 3, col. 1 (eastern ed.). 
The bankruptcy of the Penn Central as well as the collapse of the Reading, Eric 
Lackawanna, Lehigh Valley, Central of New Jersey, Boston &: Maine, and Ann Arbor 
railroads prompted Congress to enact the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985 (codified at 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-93 (Supp. 1974)). The 
Act envisions the reorganization of bankrupt lines into a unified and profitable system 
serving the northeastern and midwestern United States. 
2. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 335 F. Supp. 1026, 1030·31 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
In 1968 the Pennsylvania Railroad Company merged with the New York Central Rail-
road, see N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1968, at 1, col. 8 Qate city ed.), and in 1969 a reorganiza• 
tion plan was consummated that created the Penn Central Transportation Company as 
a subsidiary (and main asset) of the Penn Central Holding Company. See J. DAUGHEN 
&: P. B1NZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL, facing P· 113 (1971). 
3. Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 1969, at 10, col. 3 (eastern ed.). 
4. See McClintock, The Credit Checkers, Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1970, at 1, 16, cols. 6, 4 
(eastern ed.). 
5. STAFF R.EPoRT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Co1,rMISSION TO THE SPECIAL sun. 
COMM. ON lNvEsnGATIONS, 92D CONG., 2D SES.S., THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN 
CENTRAL COMPANY 245-60 (Subcomm. Print 1972). 
6. Id. at 243: "Between the tim:e of the formation of the Penn Central Transporta• 
tion Company in February 1968 and the June 1970 bankruptcy, as management de• 
libcrately and increasingly glazed its public reports with distorted optimism, many 
members of management succeeded in selling many shares of Penn Central stock." 
See also In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (E.D. Pa. 1972), 
modified, 357 F. Supp. 869 (1973), af!d., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974). 
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holders7 to hold the insiders liable under section lO(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,8 as implemented by rule lOb-5.9 
The Penn Central litigation, involving a large, publicly held 
corporation, illustrates the need to examine th·e reach of the federal 
antifraud provisions. This Note discusses the problem of defining 
the plaintiff class when the number of past and present shareholders 
who are potential plaintiffs is very great. Attention will center on 
the methods courts have used to limit the class of investors compen-
sable under rule I0b-5. Also, the effect that enactment of present 
drafts of the American Law lnstitute's proposed Federal Securities 
Code10 would have on the composition of the plaintiff class in 
7. The private fraud actions against Penn Central officers and directors have been 
consolidated for trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (M.DL. Docket No. 56). 
See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified, 
357 F. Supp. 869 (1973), afjd., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974). The quoted phrase was 
borrowed from the title of a very readable book describing the events leading to the 
railroad's demise. See J. DAUGHEN & P. BINZEN, supra note 2. 
The SEC has also filed criminal charges against Penn Central Company and its 
former top officials, alleging that they directed a massive scheme of fraud prior to the 
bankruptcy filing of the railroad subsidiary in 1970. SEC v. Penn Cent. Co., [1973-1974 
Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.11 94,527 (E.D. Pa. May 2, 1974). See also Wall 
St. J., May 3, 1974, at 3, col. 1 (midwestem ed.); Washington Post, May 3, 1974, § A, 
at 1, col. 7. 
8. 15 u.s.c. § 78j (1970): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange •.• (b) To use or employ, in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange 
or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection 
of investors. 
9. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1974) provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or, 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security. 
10. The idea for a new codification of the federal securities laws originated with 
the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Business Law of the American Bar Association. See Hershman, An Overview-
Regulation of Securities and the Securities Markets: A Timely Report to the Bar, 28 
Bus. LAw. 375 (1973). The American Law Institute accepted the challenge and selected 
Louis Loss as reporter. Thus far, three tentative drafts have been published. ALI 
FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 1, April 1972) deals with exemptions, issuer 
registrations, distributions, postregistration provisions, and definitions relating to these 
areas. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973), the draft relevant 
to this Note, predominantly covers deceptive and manipulative acts and civil liabilities 
therefor. ALI FEDERAL SECURlTIES CODE (Tent. Draft No. 3, April 1974) also deals with 
exemptions and distributions, as well as the administration, enforcement, and scope 
of the Code. For some of the history behind the codification effort see Loss, The Amer-
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analogous actions will be discussed. Finally, the Note assesses the 
viability of the private compensatory remedy in light of the di£-
. :ficulties that plague the limitation of the plaintiff class in rule 
IOb-5 actions.11 
ican Law Institute's Federal Securities Code Project, 25 Bus. LAW. 27 (1969), in ALI FED· 
ERAL SECURITIES CODE at xxix (I'ent. Draft No. 1, April 1972), 
While it is unprofitable at present to speculate whether and in what form the Code 
will be adopted, it will undoubtedly elicit much discussion from lawyers, legal scholars, 
and judges. It may have considerable influence on the courts as authority even wl1ile 
it still is being formulated. For example, the Code's definition of "knowledge" is 
relied on in Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F,2d 115, 123 n.11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 857 (1973). 
11. For the sake of clarity this Note will assume that the defendant bas violated 
rule l0b-5. It should be recognized, however, that the harshness of the private damage 
remedy is exacerbated by uncertainty concerning the elements of a violation. For ex• 
ample, it is not clear whether the defendant must have had knowledge of the false 
representation or misleading nondisclosure to be held liable. See 2 A. BROMDERG, 
SEcurunES LAws §§ 8.4(500)-(690) (Supp. 1971); Epstein, Scienter Requirement in Ac-
tions Under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C. L. REv. 482 (1970); Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a 
Continuum of Conduct To Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1206 (1970), Some circuits state that knowledge is not necessary and 
that negligence suffices. See cases collected in R. JENNINGS &: H. MARsH, SECURITIF.S 
REGULATION: CAsES AND MATERIALS 1071 nn.7, 8 (3d ed. 1972). Under the latter standard, 
it might seem easy for a defendant to stumble into a rule l0b-5 violation, but one 
commentary is skeptical of the seriousness of the risk. It questions whether "any court 
would in fact impose a crushing liability upon a corporate officer in favor of thousands 
of purchasers in the market for simple negligence in the issuance of a press release." 
Id. at 1072. The Second Circuit would not, finding negligence sufficient to support an 
injunction under rule l0b-5 but requiring scienter in a damage action. Shemtob v. 
Shearson, Hammill &: Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit has 
repeatedly affirmed its stand against the sufficiency of mere negligence. See, e.g., Chris• 
Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 910 (1974); Lanza v. Drexel &: Co., 479 F,2d 1277, 1305-06 (2d Cir. 1973); 
Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 
(1973); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 n.15 (2d Cir. 1972), 
Second Circuit decisions have recently influenced district courts in other circuits to 
come out against a negligence standard. See, e.g., Waldman v. Shearson, Hammill &: Co., 
Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,396 (D.N.J. Jan. 31, 1974); 
Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (D. Mass. 1973); Golob v. Nauman Vandervoort, 
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ohio 1972). In the recent case of Smallwood v. Pearl 
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth Circuit appears to have agreed 
with the Second Circuit that mere negligence is not sufficient. The Smallwood court 
held that although it would not "draw the bottom line on the degree of scienter re-
quired" in the circuit, some culpability beyond mere negligence is necessary. 489 F.2d 
at 606. Citing "the difficulties courts have had in trying to fit a wide variety of com-
plex fact situations and relationships within a single standard of scienter,"· the Ninth 
Circuit has recently rejected any comprehensive scienter test. White v. Abrams, [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,457, at 95,608 (9th Cir. March 15, 
1974). Instead the court of appeals proposes to determine the duty that rule lOb-5 
imposes on a particular defendant by looking at such factors as the relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant, the defendant's access to information compared 
to the plaintiff's access, the defendant's benefit from the relationship, the defendant's 
awareness of the plaintiff's reliance, and the defendant's activity in initiating the 
securities transaction. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,i 94,457, at 95,609-10. Perhaps the Ninth 
Circuit would not feel compelled to depart from more traditional state of mind 
standards if the Code's method of varying the standard with the type of violation, see 
note 29 infra, were substituted for the single standard used now. 
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Under present law, the possible reach of section lO(b) and rule 
lOb-5 is extensive. The rule imposes on corporate insiders not only 
the duty to make no affirmative misrepresentations "in connection 
with the purchase or sale of a security," but also the duty to "disclose 
material facts which are known to persons with whom they deal and 
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment."12 Courts 
have left intact the broad sweep of this language. In the leading case 
of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,13 for example, it was held that 
anyone who has access to inside corporate information that a rea-
sonable investor would consider important in making an investment 
decision may not trade in the securities of that corporation without 
disclosing the information to the investing public.14 
Congress has created an impressive array of sanctions against viola-
tors of section lO(b) and rule lOb-5, many of which are enforced 
by the SEC.15 For insiders of a large corporation, however, the most 
Another troubling problem under present law is the requirement that the informa-
tion undisclosed or misrepresented by the defendant be "material." Courts have been 
unable to articulate a clear definition of "materiality." In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), for instance, the 
Second Circuit approved two different formulations, one covering " 'those situations 
which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain to have 
a substantial effect on the market price of the security if [the extraordinary situation 
is] disclosed,' " 401 F.2d at 848, quoting Fleisher, Securities Trading and Corporate 
Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 
VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965), and the other, less strict, encompassing all facts "'which 
in reasonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation's 
stock or securities ..• .'" 401 F.2d at 849, quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 
457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), quoting Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963) 
(emphasis added by Texas Gulf Sulphur court). Either definition could conceivably 
cover educated guesses based on the sort of specialized knowledge inevitably acquired 
by an insider, a result deplored by at least one federal district judge. SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (Bonsal, J.), a/fd. in part and 
reud. in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
12, Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). In this case the SEC made clear 
for the first time that a violation of rule l0b-5 could arise from nondisclosure of 
material facts, without an express misrepresentation, in a non-face-to-face transaction 
on a securities market. 40 S.E.C. at 914. See Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 
50 CALIF. L. REv. 408, 415-16 (1962). The traditional rule had been that the affirmative 
duty of disclosure applied only in face-to-face transactions. See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 
283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Reasoning from traditional fiduciary concepts, one 
common law case expanded the affirmative disclosure duty to include a director's 
open market purchase of stock from an existing shareholder. Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 
Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). However, a distinction between purchases from existing 
shareholders and sales to nonshareholders was expressly rejected in Cady. 40 S.E.C. 
at 913. 
13. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
14. Trading may not even be required. See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra. 
For a general discussion of the liability of nontrading participants in rule l0b-5 
violations see 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, §§ 8.5(500-98) (Supp. 1970). 
15. Congress has expressly empowered the SEC to conduct investigations of possible 
past or potential violations and to publish information concerning such violations. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a)-(c) (1970). Some skepticism has been voiced regarding the efficacy of 
this sanction. See, e.g., Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, 39 HARV. Bus. REv., 
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fearsome sanction is the private damage remedy implied by the 
courts under rule IOb-5.16 The number of possible plaintiffs is large, 
and the extent of their loss is potentially as great as the number of 
outstanding shares multiplied by the drop in price. Penn Central 
Company, for example, had 24,110,321 shares of common stock out-
standing as of December 31, 1971;17 during the period from 1968 to 
1970, the price of its stock fell from 86 l /2 per share to 5 1 /2 per 
share.18 Those investors who bought or held Penn Central stock in 
ignorance of the company's financial weakness thus suffered an im-
mense aggregate loss, grossly disproportionate to the savings made by 
insiders who sold their holdings before news of the bankruptcy 
reached the public. To require those insiders to reimburse all share-
holders for their losses would be unduly harsh, and would also be 
impossible to effect. If no limitations on the plaintiff class are im-
posed, those who profit will lack the necessary funds to pay those 
injured. The result would not be reimbursement but personal 
bankruptcy. 
The proposed Federal Securities Code generally achieves a more 
reasonable result because in many situations it imposes a ceiling on 
the possible extent of the defendant's liability.19 In accord with its 
objective of rectifying the overlap and "scatteration" of the present 
July-Aug. 1961, at I, 6 (indicating that the business community does not seriously con• 
demn insider trading). However, Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progeny may have pro• 
duced a less cynical attitude among corporate officials. A new study might be fruitful, 
The SEC can tum over information gathered through investigations to the attorney 
general for use in criminal prosecutions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970). The Securities and 
E."'l:change Act provides for fines of up to 10,000 dollars and imprisonment for up to 
two years for willful violations of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970). 
In addition, the SEC may obtain injunctions barring further violations. 15 U,S.C, 
§ 78u(e) (1970). And in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), the court acknowledged the Commission's authority to 
seek restitutionary relief to deprive insiders of the fruits of their wrongdoing. 446 F,2d 
at 1307-08. No specific statutory authority exists for such relief, but the court upheld 
the authority of a district court to grant restitution as an ancillary remedy in the 
exercise of its general equity powers. 446 F.2d at 1307. The court stipulated that the 
SEC might seek "other than injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of 
the Act, so long as such relief is remedial relief and not a penalty assessment." 446 F,2d 
at 1308. 
16. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 
(1965); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961); Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E,D, 
Pa. 1946). Other cases are collected in 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3871•'13 (2d 
ed. Supp. 1969); Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5: Judicial Revision of Legis/a. 
tive Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L REv. 627, 687-90 (1960). It has been suggested that the private 
cause of action implied under rule lOb-5 should extend only to suits brought by 
sellers, but the idea has won little acceptance. See 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note II, § 2.4(2) 
(Supp. 1971). , 
17. MOODY'S TRANSPORTATION MANUAL 568 (1972), 
18. Id. 
19. See text following note 44 infra and text accompanying notes 161-62 infra. 
June 1974] Notes 1403 
statutes, 20 the Code breaks down and delineates antifraud violations 
that are now covered in a broad manner by section IO(b) and rule 
IOb-5, as well as by other provisions and rules.21 Part XIII (sections 
1301 to 1311) groups all of the provisions that prohibt acts of 
fraud, misrepresentation, or manipulation. Section 130l(a), a princi-
pal counterpart to the present section IO(b), makes it unlawful to 
engage in fraudulent securities transactions, proxy solicitations, or 
tender requests. Section 1303(a) prohibits trading by insiders if they 
know a "fact of special significance" that is not generally available. 
The practice of fraud in connection ·with filings, records, and pub-
licity is outlawed by section 1304. Other provisions less similar to 
present actions under rule lOb-5 make it illegal to give fraudulent 
investment advice (section 1302); to misrepresent Commission ap-
proval (section 1305); or to engage in churning (section 1306),22 
touting (section 1307),23 manipulation (section 1308),24 or stabiliza-
tion (section 1309).25 
20. See ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Introductory Memorandum at xv-xvi (Tent. 
Draft No. 2, March 1973), which lists the principal problems with the present statutes. 
21. However, the Code is not intended completely to supersede the growth of the 
common law in the rule lOb-5 area. Reporter Louis Loss early in the project indicated 
that he would not "codify the law in that area completely" because in a time of rapid 
development of a federal corporation law it might not be prudent "to foreclose judicial 
invention of private rights of action" by making "everything express." Loss, supra note 
10, at 34. 
22. Churning occurs when a broker who has been granted discretion by a client to 
trade on his account abuses that discretion by engaging in transactions that are exces-
sive or overfrequent in light of the nature of the account. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARsH, 
supra note 11, at 837-38. The Code section on churning would also cover abuses by 
brokers who have authority for excessive trading in a client's account by reason of 
the client's willingness to follow the broker's suggestions. 
23. This Code provision covers the situation in which a person describes or 
recommends a security to a second person for consideration from a third person, such 
as an issuer or broker, who is interested in buying or selling the stock. The first 
person must disclose the source of consideration. Thus, A cannot receive money from · 
B in consideration for desa·ibing B's stock to C unless C knows or is told that A is 
being paid by B. This provision is a recodification (with minor changes) of section 
17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1970). 
24. Manipulation can take a number of forms under the Code. Manipulation by 
touting is defined in section 1308(a) as the dissemination by a buyer or seller, or prospec-
tive buyer or seller, of a security of "information to the effect that the price of a 
security of the ••. issuer ... will or is likely to rise or fall because of the market 
operations of any person conducted for the purpose of raising or depressing the price 
of the first security." This provision is derived from sections 9{a)(3) and 9(a)(5) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(a)(3), (5) (1970). See R. JENNINGS & 
H. MARSH, supra note 11, at 924-25. 
Wash sales and matched orders-phony or offsetting sales made to give the ap-
pearance of active trading in securities-are prohibited in section 1308(b), and sec-
tion 1308(c) prohibits manipulation by trading. 
25. Stabilization, under both present law and under the Code, is a transaction de-
signed to fix or peg the price of a security. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 
11, at 869-924. 
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Part XIV (sections 1401 to 1424) establishes civil liabilities for the 
violation of the provisions of part XIII. Section 1402 provides a pri-
vate remedy for buyers and sellers victimized by deceptive sales or 
purchases in violation of sections 130l(a)(l) or 1303(a). Buyers and 
sellers injured by false publicity prohibited by section 1304(c) have a 
remedy in section 1406. Other sections of part XIV create civil lia-
bilities for violations of the provisions against manipulation and 
stabilization (section 1408), churning (section 1410), and fraudulent 
proxy solicitations and tender requests (section 1412). Liabilities are 
also created, without reference to part XIII, for false registration 
statements, offering statements, and annual reports;20 other false 
filings;27 and false distribution statements.28 In addition, section 
1423(a) allows a court to "recognize a private action based on a 
violation of a provision of this Code or a rule or order thereunder ... 
even though it is not expressly created by part XIV." By creating 
distinct liability sections with differing elements the Code avoids 
the blunderbuss approach of the present law under rule lOb-5.20 
26. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1403 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973). 
27. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1404 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973). 
28. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1405 (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973). Section 509 
of the first tentative draft, completed in March 1972, requires the filing of distribution 
statements prior to certain secondary distributions. 
29. The Code would also settle disputes among the circuits over the necessity of 
scienter. See note 11 supra. First, it expressly defines knowledge: "When reference is 
made to this section, a misrepresentation is known by a person to be a misreprcscnta• 
tion if he (a) knows or believes that the matter is otherwise than represented, (b) docs 
not have the confidence in its existence or nonexistence that he expresses or implies, 
or (c) knows that he does not have the basis that he states or implies he has for liis 
belief." ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 251A (Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973). 
Second, the Code makes clear the scienter requirement for each type of violation. 
Under section 1402, which prohibits insider trading, negligence suffices for liability, 
and the burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not negligent. Negligence is 
also sufficient under section 1403, which creates liability for misrepresentations (defined 
in section 259 to include material omissions) in registration statements, offering state• 
ments, and annual reports. If the plaintiff proves that the defendant had actual knowl• 
edge as defined in section 251A, however, the limitations on damages imposed by 
section 1403(g)(2) do not apply. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 251A, Comment (4) 
(Tent. Draft No. 2, April 1973). (Section 1403(g)(2) limits damages with respect to 
each defendant to the greatest of $100,000, one per cent of the defendant's gross income 
for the last fiscal year, or where the violation is based on the defendant's sale of stock, 
his profit from later repurchasing the same type of securities at a lower price.) Section 
1404, which deals with misrepresentations in filings other than those covered by sec• 
tion 1403, requires proof that the defendant had knowledge. Negligence suffices under 
section 1405 to establish liability for false distribution statements, but an underwriter 
without section 251A knowledge is not liable for falsely certifying that he is unaware 
of any further information that must be disclosed. Liability under section 1406 for 
false publicity is also predicated on the existence of section 251A knowledge. 
The Code would also end some of the confusion surrounding the definition of 
materiality. See note 11 supra. Section 256(a) states: "A fact is 'material' if a reasonable 
person would attach importance to it under the circumstances in determining his 
course of action." Section 259(a) incorporates this concept into the definition of mis• 
representation: " 'Misrepresentation' means (1) an untrue statement of a material fact, 
or (2) an omission to state a material fact necessary to prevent the statements made 
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Perhaps more valuable than the Code's orderly structure of rights 
and remedies, however, are the methods it employs to limit the 
plaintiff class in a rule l0b-5-type action. Present judicially devel-
oped limitations require privity, a showing that the plaintiff did not 
merely retain his stock during the period of insider wrongdoing, 
proof of reliance on the defendant's representations or nondisclo-
sures, and the establishment of a causal connection between the 
inadequate disclosure and the plaintiff's economic loss. The following 
analysis compares the Code's limitations with those developed by the 
courts. 
I. PRIVITY 
Privity-generally defined as "[m]utual or successive relationship 
to the same rights of property"30-was formerly a common require-
ment in actions based on fraud or misrepresentation.31 If strictly im-
posed it would allow a plaintiff to sue only the person from whom he 
bought or to whom he sold.32 A rigid privity requirement thus can-
not be insisted upon in cases involving stocks sold on an open 
market.33 
However, a fairly early case, Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Tele-
vision Corp.,34 required that "[a] semblance of privity"35 be estab-
lished between the defendant-vendor and the plaintiff. In that case 
the court dismissed a rule lOb-5 suit in part because the insiders' 
last sale of allegedly overvalued stock occurred weeks before the 
plaintiffs purchased similar stock. Although the district court ad-
mitted that the defendants may have engaged in fraud, it held that 
there was no fraud on these particular plaintiffs. It refused to rule on 
the rights of investors who bought their stock during the period of 
the defendants' sales,36 thereby implying that the required "sem-
from being misleading in the light of the circumstances under which they were made." 
A narrower definition of materiality applies in cases of silence (failure to disclose). 
Section 1303, which deals with an insider's duty to disclose while trading, introduces 
the term "fact of special significance," defined as a material fact that if disclosed would 
"affect the market price of a security to a significant extent" or a fact to which "a 
reasonable person would attach decisive importance • . . in determining his course of 
action.'' 
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (4th ed. 1951). 
31. 2 A. BROMBERG, supra note 11, § 8.5(110). 
32. Id. 
33. Securities exchange transactions are impersonal and not conducive to matching 
particular investors. See Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 607, 644 (1964); Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule IOb-5 Duty To Disclose 
Material Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. R.Ev. 
944, 958 n.79 (1967). 
34. 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afjd., 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). 
35. 99 F. Supp. at 706. 
36. 99 F. Supp. at 706. 
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blance of privity" may exist if the plaintiff and the defendant buy and 
sell at approximately the same time. 
Most courts, however, have abandoned the privity requirement.37 
Plaintiffs even have been allowed to proceed against defendants who 
engaged in no trading whatsoever. In Heit v. Weitzen,38 for example, 
the court allowed recovery even though it was unlikely that the de-
fendants-a corporation, several of its directors, and a vice-president 
-had any concern with the price of the corporation's stock. Their 
wrongdoing primarily involved overcharges on government contracts, 
and they engaged in no trading of the securities of the corporation. 
The stockholder-plaintiffs charged that the defendants had violated 
rule I0b-5 by their failure to disclose that a substantial part of the 
corporation's income for fiscal 1964 was derived from these over-
charges and by their consequent misstatement of the corporation's 
assets in press releases and an annual report. The Second Circuit 
court of appeals held that a cause of action was stated under rule 
lOb-5 where the deceptive device employed would cause reasonable 
investors to trade in reliance thereon, whether or not the defendants 
engaged in contemporaneous trading.39 
Although a privity requirement has been largely abandoned, 
courts still occasionally speak in "semblance of privity" terms. In In 
re Caesars Palace Securities Litigation40 the court stated: 
[N]o court has yet advocated an unconditional abandonment of 
privity, and it is axiomatic that some legally cognizable relation-
ship, perhaps akin to the "semblance of privity" concept espoused in 
Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp. . . . must be 
present between the parties before liability may be imposed. . • . 
[I]f this underlying concept of privity was totally disregarded, a 
burden out of all proportion to the fault involved might be cast 
upon anyone who makes false assertions in the marketplace.41 
37. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Heit v. 
Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Texas Continental 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace 
Trust Co., [1973 Transfer Binder) CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1J 94,206, at 94,880 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 1973) ("While no court has yet completely abandoned a requirement 
of some legally cognizable relationship between plaintiffs and defendants, • • • it is 
nevertheless well established in this circuit that the traditional element of privity is not 
a prerequisite to Rule IOb-5 liability"); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler &: Co., [1973 
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L REP. 1J 94,133, at 94,542 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 1973) 
("[P]rivity of contract does not seem to be required for the maintenance of a section 
IO(b) cause of action, ••• indeed, it may have all but disappeared as a prerequisite"): 
Freed v. Szabo Food Serv. Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH F.£JJ. SEc. L. REP, 
~ 91,317 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Miller v. Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 229 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 
1964). 
38. 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969). 
39. 402 F.2d at 913; accord, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). 
40. 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
41. 360 F. Supp. at 376-77. 
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The Caesars Palace plaintiffs, purchasers of debentures of Caesar's 
World Inc., were attempting to sue the shareholders, employees, of-
ficers, and partners of the corporation and partnership that sold the 
Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino to Caesar's World. Caesar's World 
and its officers were also defendants. The alleged violations involved 
dissemination of false and misleading information about the Casino's 
financial status and misstatements and omissions in the registration 
statements and annual report of Caesar's World. The Caesars Palace 
defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as to them on several 
grounds, including lack of privity. Despite the court's concern for a 
"semblance of privity," it refused to dismiss the complaint, finding 
that "an actionable relationship exist[ ed] benveen the parties."42 It 
did, however, invite the defendants to resubmit the question if, pur-
suant to discovery, they were able to prove that "a total absence of 
privity exist[ ed]."43 
Caesars Palace, however, should not be construed as requiring 
"privity" in the sense that recovery can be had only for those 
tainted shares that are traced through the market from the defen-
dants to the plaintiffs. The court may well have been troubled by the 
broader problem that the plaintiffs' securities were not even issued 
by the corporation in which the Caesars Palace defendants held an 
interest. Thus, the "legally cognizable relationship" that the case 
requires may be more in the nature of an insider-stockholder relation-
ship than a purchaser-seller relationship. 
The Federal Securities Code follows the current general practice 
and does not impose a privity requirement. Professor Loss pointed 
out that this is not without its disadvantages: 
I know it's fashionable for law professors particularly to pooh-pooh 
privity as a concept in deceit, and I have done it along with others, 
but when you abandon the privity concept and make a director or 
officer liable to everybody who has bought or sold in the market 
because there is a false press release or a false report, or something of 
that sort, the potential liability is really quite horrendous in rela-
tion to the crime, if it be a crime. 
Again, I'm not suggesting that there should never be liability here. 
I'm simply saying that, when you abandon a basic concept like 
privity, you must think through the implications .... 44 
The Code's pol-icy of limiting excessive liability tempers the effect 
of its abandonment of the privity requirement. In cases involving 
false registration statements, offering statements, and reports (section 
1403); other false filings (section 1404); false distribution statements 
(section 1405); and false publicity (section 1406), the Code sets a 
ceiling on damages for each defendant at the greatest of $100,000, one 
42. 360 F. Supp. at 377. 
43. 360 F. Supp. at 377. 
44. Loss, supra note 10, at 35. 
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per cent (to a maximum of $1,000,000) of the defendant's gross in-
come for the last fiscal year, or the defendant's profit from selling and 
buying or buying and selling securities of the type in question. 
Moreover, section 1402, which deals with deceptive sales and pur-
chases, distinguishes between face-to-face and market transactions. 
Section 1402(a) makes a defendant in a face-to-face transaction liable 
to only his immediate buyer or seller. In contrast, section 1402(b) 
provides that when the matching of buyer and seller is "substantially 
fortuitous," a defendant is liable to all who buy or sell between the 
day the defendant unlawfully buys or sells and the day when all 
material facts become generally available. Although similar to a 
"semblance of privity" requirement, section 1402(b) more accurately 
deals with causation-of-loss, since persons not within its time pro-
vision would not have been injured by the defendant's actions. This 
limitation on plaintiffs pinpoints those injured, rather than those 
who bought or sold at approximately the same time as the defendant, 
which was the concern of the Farnsworth Radio court. 
While a privity requirement would eliminate many plaintiffs in 
actions such as the Penn Central case, and thus protect some defen-
dants from potentially disproportionate private damage judgments, 
•its passing need not be mourned. It creates an arbitrary distinction in 
the context of a national market on which the securities of large, 
publicly held corporations are sold. An investor who trades on a 
public securities exchange neither knows nor cares whether he pur-
chased his particular shares from a corporate insider. 40 The privity 
requirement would thus make compensation in rule IOb-5 cases 
depend on a fortuitous event-whether or not a particular investor 
engaged in securities trading during approximately the same time 
period as an insider accused of wrongdoing. 
II. THE BIRNBAUM DoGTRINE 
Although they have rejected the privity requirement, the courts 
have sought to replace it with other theories of limitation. One of 
these theories, the so-called Birnbaum doctrine, disqualifies plaintiffs 
who merely retain securities during the period of the defendant's 
nondisclosure or misrepresentation. This limitation differs from the 
"semblance of privity" requirement in that the period of defendant's 
wrongful representations, not the period of the defendant's trading, 
marks the time in which the plaintiffs must buy or sell the securities 
in question. 
The Birnbaum requirement arose not from concepts of common 
law privity but from the legislative history of section 1 0(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act and the language of that section that pro-
45. Of course, an investor might care to know that he is buying while insiders arc 
selling, or vice versa. 
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hibits the use of manipulative and deceptive devices "in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security."46 Rule lOb-5 also applies 
only to devices used "in connection with" a securities transaction.47 
In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.48 the Second Circuit an-
nounced that section lO(b) "was directed solely at that type of mis-
representation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale 
or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of 
corporate affairs, and that rule X-lOb-5 extended protection only to 
the defrauded purchaser or seller."49 Applying this interpretation, 
the court dismissed a suit brought by minority shareholders charging 
that the individual defendant had made misrepresentations "in con-
nection with" the sale of his controlling interest in one of the defen-
dant corporations. The sale was made for a substantial premium after 
the defendant rejected a merger that would have been very profitable 
to all of the corporation's shareholders, including the plaintiffs. The 
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant's sale of a 
controlling interest met the requirements of rule lOb-5 and found 
that the plaintiffs, who had retained their securities, were not "pur-
chasers or sellers" within the meaning of the rule. 50 
The Birnbam:n case thus derived two requirements from the "in 
connection with" language of section IO(b) and rule lOb-5. The 
first distinguishes defendants whose ·wrongdoing involves trading 
from those charged with "mere mismanagement"; the second dis-
tinguishes plaintiffs who are purchasers and sellers from investors 
who retain their stock through the period of wrongdoing. 51 
The first requirement has a valid rationale. Common law con-
cepts of fiduciary duty have traditionally covered corporate misman-
agement,52 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was designed to 
protect the integrity of the trading market rather than to oversee in-
ternal corporate operations.53 Ironically, however, it is this require-
ment that the courts may have diluted.54 The Supreme Court, in 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). The text of this section is set out in note 8 supra. 
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1974). The text of rule lOb-5 is set out in note 9 supra. 
48. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
49. 193 F.2d at 464. 
50. 193 F.2d at 463-64. 
51. Analytically the two requirements are distinct, although in practice plaintiffs 
are more likely to be purchasers or sellers in trading than in mismanagement cases. 
The unsuccessful plaintiffs in Birnbaum subsequently recovered under state law on 
the theory that the defendant had appropriated a corporate opportunity to his own 
benefit. Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) (diversity jurisdiction). 
52. w. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 264 (1968); Simmons v. 
Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456-57 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 999 {1971). 
53. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 808 (5th Cir. 1970). 
54. A prediction of the demise of Birnbaum should be ventured cautiously. It has 
been made before and has been proved wrong. Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum 
Doctrine: A New Era for Rule IOb-5, 54 VA. L. REv. 268 (1968). 
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Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life b Casualty Co.,r.r, 
stretched the scope of section IO(b) to cover a situation that, although 
peripherally involving a sale of securities, was more a case of corpo-
rate looting than of abuse of the securities market. The "misrepre-
sentation" in question was that Manhattan, the corporate seller of 
certain United States Treasury bonds, would receive the proceeds 
from the sale. In fact the proceeds were used by an individual de-
fendant to purchase Manhattan stock. 56 The Court found the scheme 
to be "an 'act' or 'practice' within the meaning of Rule IOb-5 which 
operated as a 'fraud or deceit' on Manhattan ... "07 and held that the 
plaintiff58 had stated a cause of action under section IO(b).00 
The Court expressly rejected the Second Circuit's view that sec-
tion IO(b) is "limited to preserving the integrity of the securities 
market.''60 All that is required for redress under section IO(b), it said, 
is "a 'sale' of a security and ... fraud ... used 'in connection with' 
it ... .''61 Manhattan was protected because it "suffered an injury as 
a result of deceptive practices touching its sales of securities as an 
investor,"62 the securities being the Treasury bonds. The Court's 
language seemingly eliminates any requirement as to the defendant 
other than that he engage in a fraud that in some manner can be con-
nected with a purchase or sale of securities. The connection in 
Bankers Life seems to have been tenuous indeed. Certainly there 
55. 404 U.S. 6 (19'71). 
56. One Begole paid for the stock with a check obtained from the Irving Trust 
Company for which there were no funds on deposit. After Begole acquired the Man• 
hattan stock, Manhattan sold its United States Treasury bonds for $4,854,552.67. The 
proceeds from this sale, plus enough cash to bring the total to $5,000,000, were trans• 
£erred to Manhattan's account at Irving Trust against which the Irving Trust check 
was then charged. Irving Trust issued a second $5,000,000 check to Manhattan that 
Manhattan's new president tendered to the Belgian-American Bank and Trust Com• 
pany, which issued a $5,000,000 certificate of deposit in the name of Manhattan, The 
certificate was assigned to the New England Note Corporation and was then endorsed 
to the Belgian-American Banking Corporation as collateral for a $5,000,000 loan to 
New England. The proceeds from this loan were used to cover the second Irving 
Trust check for $5,000,000. The outcome was that Begole had used Manhattan assets 
to purchase the Manhattan stock from Bankers Life. Manhattan's books reflected only 
the sale of its government bonds and the purchase of the certificate of deposit. They 
did not show that its assets had been used to purchase Manhattan's shares or as• 
signed to New England and then pledged to Belgian-American. 404 U.S. at 7-9. 
57. 404 U.S. at 9. 
58. The Superintendent of Insurance sued on behalf of Manhattan but really 
represented Manhattan's creditors. The Supreme Court approved this procedure on 
the ground that controlling stockholders owe fiduciary obligations to their corpora• 
tions for the benefit of its creditors as well as its minority shareholders. 404 U.S. at 12, 
Manhattan Casualty Company had no minority shareholders. 404 U.S. at 7. 
59. 404 U.S. at 13-14. 
60. 404 U.S. at 12, quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &: Cas. Co., 430 
F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1970), revd., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
61. 404 U.S. at 12. 
62. 404 U.S. at 12-13. 
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were contrivances to hide the absence of the appropriated assets. 
However, the purchases, transfers, and pledge63 merely concealed the 
primary wrongdoing, which was not an abuse of the market process 
but simple misappropriation. Although cases of purely internal 
corporate mismanagement in which no defendant trades are not 
brought within the reach of section IO(b), Bankers Life does seem to 
reject Birnbaum insofar as certain breaches of fiduciary duty are 
concemed.64 Plaintiffs ordinarily should have little trouble satisfying 
the "touch test" of Bankers Life,65 but the "mere mismanagement" 
limitation still may be viable in cases in which the alleged wrong-
doing is completely divorced from any securities transaction.66 
The proposed, Code adds little and settles nothing in the area of 
the "mere mismanagement" distinction drawn by Birnbaum. The In-
troductory Memorandum points out that one of the principal prob-
lems with the present state of the law is that "[i]t has become in-
creasingly difficult to draw the line between violation of Rule lOb-5 
in stockholders' derivative actions and the traditional case of cor-
porate mismanagement that merely happens to involve a securities 
transaction."67 Despite their realization of the problem, however, the 
drafters intentionally chose to leave open "as simply not ripe for 
codification . . . the delicate question of drawing a line between 
securities fraud and corporate mismanagement .... " 68 Fearing that 
any bright line would be too tight or too loose, they concluded that 
"[t]he Golden Mean will have to be pricked out in the common-law 
tradition."69 
Accordingly, section 1301(a) makes it unlawful to engage in a 
deceptive act or misrepresentation "in connection with" a security 
transaction, a proxy solicitation, or a tender request.70 By using the 
63. See note 56 supra. 
64. Cf. 404 U.S. at 12. 
65. See, e.g., Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy 
v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 155 (3d Cir. 1973); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,206, at 94,880-81 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 
1973). 
66. See, e.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1973); Waltzer v. Billera, 
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 94,011 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1973); 
Seeburg-Commonwealth United Litigation, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. 
L. REP. 11 93,802 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
67. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Introductory Memorandum at xvii (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, March 1973). 
68. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Introductory Memorandum at xxi (Tent. Draft 
No. 2, March 1973). 
69. ALI FEDERAL 5ECURITD1S CODE§ 1423(a), Comment (6) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 
1973). 
70. ALI FEDERAL SECURITlES CODE § 130l(a} (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973): 
It is unlawful for any person to engage in a deceptive act or a misrepresenta-
tion in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to sell or 
buy a security, or an inducement to liold a security, (2) a proxy solicitation or 
other circularization of security holders in respect of a security of a registrant, 
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"in connection with" language of section IO(b) and rule IOb-5, the 
Code incorporates the present case law distinguishing securities cases 
from mismanagement cases. In addition, section 22571 prevents 
blanket inclusion of simple corporate mismanagement cases by de-
fining "a deceptive act" as a fraudulent or deceptive "act, device, 
scheme, practice, or course of conduct." However, "[t]he existence of 
a deceptive act is not precluded by the fact that it constitutes com-
pany 'mismanagement."72 
The second limitation imposed by Birnbaum grants standing only 
to plaintiffs who actually purchase or sell securities during the period 
of wrongdoing, and it is less reasonable than the "mere mismanage-
ment" distinction. It assumes that Congress intended to withhold 
protection from investors induced to retain declining securities by an 
abuse of the market process. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Birnbaum court relied heavily on 
the express intention of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in adopting rule IOb-5 "to close [a] ' ... loophole in the protections 
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting in-
dividuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud 
in their purchase.' "73 
Far from closing a loophole, however, the Birnbaum standing 
requirement carves out a limitation that serves no purpose other than 
arbitrarily to narrow the plaintiff class in a given case.74 It eliminates 
plaintiffs who may well have suffered damage equal to or greater than 
that suffered by those plaintiffs whose action it allows, for the decision 
or (3) a tender request or a recommendation to security holders in favor of or 
opposition to a tender request. 
71. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIF.S CODE § 225 (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973): 
(a) "Deceptive act" includes an act, device, scheme, practice, or course of con-
duct that (I) is fraudulent, (2) operates or would operate as a fraud, or (3) is 
likely to deceive regardless of whether deception is intended. 
(b) Inaction or silence when there is a duty to act or speak may be a de-
ceptive act. 
(c) The existence of a deceptive act is not precluded by the fact that it con-
stitutes company mismanagement. 
72. See § 225(c), cited at note 71 supra. 
73. 193 F.2d at 463, quoting SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Fraudulent prac-
tices by sellers were directly pi:;oscribed by section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). The failure to mention fraudulent practices by buyers created 
the "loophole" that rule IOb-5 closed. 193 F.2d at 463. In closing the loophole, how• 
ever, the court made reference to the fact that section 17(a) "only made it unlawful 
to defraud purchasers of securities." 193 F.2d at 463 (emphasis original). Its conclusion 
that rule lOb-5 meant only to augment the earlier statute led it to adopt a similar 
limitation. 
74. This has been sufficient justification for the few who have put forth any rationale 
for the standing rule. See Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Kellogg, 
The Inability To Obtain Analytical Precision Where Standing To Sue Under Rule 
I0b-5 Is Involved, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 93, 114-16 (1970). But unless some legal theory for 
precluding suits by mere "holders" of securities is offered, one might just as reasonably 
preclude suits by persons born on Tuesdays and Thursdays. 
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not to sell stock is as potentially dangerous as the decision to buy it. 
The protection afforded a given plaintiff should not depend on 
whether he actually traded in securities but whether the defendant's 
fraud affected his decision to trade or retain.75 Despite its illogic, the 
Birnbaum standing rule has already been applied in a motion for 
summary judgment against certain Penn Central investors who 
neither purchased nor sold Penn Central securities during the 
period of alleged wrongdoing.76 
Although the Supreme Court has never spoken on the Birnbaum 
standing requirement, its statement in Bankers Life77 that "[s]ection 
IO(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively"78 has 
been relied on by many courts in eroding the rule. In Bankers Life 
the Court found the plaintiff79 to be a seller of securities, making it 
unnecessary to review the validity of the purchaser-seller require-
ment. However, the case strained the requirement. The plaintiff was 
a seller only because it was induced to convert an asset-bonds-into 
a form-cash-that could be appropriated more easily. 
Courts often assert the standing requirement to bar a suit that 
could as easily have been dismissed for failure to complain of more 
than an ordinary breach of fiduciary duty.80 On the other hand, the 
standing requirement has been circumvented by liberal interpreta-
tions and exceptions in cases that do not easily fit within it. 
For example, in Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.81 the Second Cir-
cuit gave standing to a plaintiff whose corporation had been sub-
jected to a short form merger,82 even though he had not yet sold his 
75. See W. PAINTER, supra note 52, at 284. 
76. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1333-36 (E.D. Pa. 1972), 
modified, 357 F. Supp. 869 (1973), afjd., 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974). The Third Circuit 
affirmed the district court's decision that the exchange of shares pursuant to the 1969 
reorganization of the railroad, see note 1 supra, was not a purchase or sale of securities: 
Although the point is not raised on this appeal, several of the complaints do 
allege insider selling by defendants which might be considered the "sale" in 
connection with which fraud occurred. If these are relevant sales, however, we 
do not see how plaintiffs could be considered to be "investors and •.. principals 
in the [sales] transaction" which ••• [is] considered necessary for standing ..•• 
The plaintiffs in this case allege no relationship whatsoever with the insider sales 
"in connection with" which fraud is alleged. 
494 F.2d at 533 n.6. 
77. Discussed in text accompanying notes 55-66 supra. 
78. 404 U.S. at 12. 
79. Technically the plaintiff was the Superintendent of Insurance suing on behall 
of the creditors of the seller. See note 58 supra. 
80. E.g., Simmons v. Wolfson, 428 F.2d 455, 456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 999 (1971); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968); Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952); Levine v. Seilon, Inc., [1970-
1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[ 92,941 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd. on other 
grounds, 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971). 
81. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). 
82. The relevant statutory short form merger allowed a corporation owning 95 
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stock, because his only options were to accept the acquiring corpora• 
tion's cash offer or to exercise his appraisal rights. Since the plaintiff 
eventually would receive cash for his shares, the court felt that requir-
ing him to sell as a condition to bringing suit would be a "needless 
formality."83 This "forced seller" doctrine has also covered plaintiffs 
forced to sell because of antitrust lawss4 or the defendants' control of 
the market for the stock.so 
Courts have found "purchases" and "sales" in mergers,so ex-
changes of assets for stock in corporate reorganizations,87 liquida-
tions,ss and the issuance of stock.so A "forced purchaser" rule has 
evolved to cover plaintiffs, usually brokers, who buy securities after 
the period of the wrongdoing because of the defendant's failure to 
pay for them.0° Courts have relaxed the standing requirement to 
allow the maintenance of actions by "aborted purchasers or sellers" 
who would have entered into a securities transaction had it not been 
for the fraud of the defendant,91 and the requirement has been com-
pletely eliminated in suits seeking only injunctive relief.92 
In view of the disinclination of courts to apply the Birnbaum 
standing requirement it is surprising that it is still paid lip service.93 
per cent of the shares of another corporation to merge into the other corporation 
without the consent of the remaining shareholders. 374 F.2d at 633. 
83. 374 F.2d at 634. 
84. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert, 
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). 
85. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). 
86. See, e.g., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Dasho v. Susquehanna 
Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967); Goldstein v. Regal 
Crest, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 396 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
87. See, e.g., Swanson v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (7th Cir, 
1969). 
88. See, e.g., Coffee v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 920 (1973). 
89. See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), 
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961). 
90. See, e.g., A.T. Brod &: Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Jeffries &: Co, 
v. Arkus-Duntov, 357 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
91. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1973) (as 
modified on denial of rehearing and rehearing en bane). In Manor Drug Stores an 
antitrust suit against a trading stamp company resulted in a consent decree requiring 
divestiture by the shareholders of the company of 55 per cent of their interest. This was 
to be accomplished by merging the company into a new company and offering stock 
of the new company to those retail users of the stamps who were not shareholders in 
the old company. The plaintiffs were dissuaded from accepting the offer by a mis• 
leading prospectus, and the court ruled that they had standing because the consent 
decree served as the equivalent of a contractual relationship, thus providing objective 
evidence that the plaintiffs would have purchased had the transaction not been aborted 
by the fraud of the defendants. 492 F.2d at 141-42. · 
92. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); 
Mutual Shares v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). 
93. Many circuits recently have rejected expressly or impliedly the opportunity to 
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For example, in Heyman v. Heyman94 the court, after making it clear 
that the Birnbaum doctrine would still be followed, granted standing 
to the beneficiary of a trust that was funded by a fraudulent sale. The 
court acknowledged that the plaintiff "[ did] not fit comfortably 
within the rubric of 'seller,' "95 but, since the plaintiff would be the 
beneficiary of the sale of the stock, the court found that her connec-
tion with the sale was sufficiently intimate to bring her within the 
Birnbaum rule.96 The holding in Interf!ational Control Corp. v. 
Vesco91 that a stock dividend was a sale even though there was no 
consideration98 prompted the dissenting judge to say "I fear that the 
decision of the majority may portend the demise of the Birnbaum 
rule."99 
Dissatisfaction with the Birnbaum doctrine in the Seventh Circuit 
finally lead to its overt rejection. In Eason v. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp.10•0 the court observed: "Instead of stating the issue in 
terms of standing, we think it more useful to ask whether the 
plaintiffs were members of the class for whose special benefit Rule 
lOb-5 was adopted."101 Answering the charge that the rejection of 
Birnbaum would create an unmanageable flood of litigation, the 
court responded that the number of parties who can satisfy its 
"special class"· test may not differ materially from the number who 
qualify under the present flexible interpretation of the purchaser-
seller requirement.102 In any event, the court noted, the SEC could 
overturn the purchaser-seller requirement. See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 
F.2d 579, 589-90 (5th Cir. 1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3595 (U.S. April 22, 1974); James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 
F.2d 944, 947 (6th Cir. 1973); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421, 
425-26 (1st Cir. 1973); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 521 n.9 (8th Cir. 
1973); Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972); Drachman 
v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, revd. on rehearing en bane, 453 F.2d 736, 738 (2~ Cir. 1971). 
94. 356 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
95. 356 F. Supp. at 966. 
96. 356 F. Supp. at 965. 
97. 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974). 
98. The distribution of the stock dividend was part of a scheme by which the 
defendants transferred the assets of International Controls Corp. (ICC) to other cor-
porations controlled by the defendants, in fraud of investors in ICC. In the dividend 
transaction, ICC incorporated Fairfield General as a wholly owned subsidiary and 
subsequently transferred stock that ICC held in Fairfield Aviation, also an ICC sub-
sidiary, to Fairfield General in return for Fairfield General stock. This stock was 
distributed to ICC shareholders as a dividend. The issuance was held _to be a sale. 
490 F.2d at 1343-46. 
99. 490 F.2d at 1359. 
100. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.LW. 3595 (U.S. April 22, 1974). 
101. 490 F.2d at 658. For lower court decisions rejecting Birnbaum see Young v. Sea-
board Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490 (D. Utah 1973); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 
F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972). ' 
102. 490 F.2d at 660. 
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amend rule IOb-5 if it became unwieldy.103 The argument that 
Birnbaum should be followed for the sake of preserving national 
consistency was also rejected. The court was skeptical of the con-
sistency of Birnbaum's following at the present time and felt that 
only the Supreme Court could unify the law in the area.104 
The Code, surprisingly, does not resolve the purchaser-seller 
dispute. Part XIII, however, does establish that inducement to hold 
a security can be an unlawful act. Section 1301(a)(l) makes it unlaw-
ful to "engage in a deceptive act or misrepresentation in connection 
with ... an inducement to hold a security,"106 and section 130l(b) 
creates a duty to correct information that is later discovered to be a 
misrepresentation if it induced a person to hold. Likewise, section 
1303(a) prohibits an insider-trader from inducing an investor to hold 
a security if he knows a fact of special significance100 that is not gen-
erally available. Also, section 1304(c) makes it unlawful to induce 
the holding of securities by deceptive acts in connection with, or 
misrepresentations in, a "press release or other form of publicity," 
and section 1304( d) creates a duty of correction. 
Despite the clear intent of part XIII to cover antifraud violations 
connected with the holding of securities, part XIV does not expressly 
provide a private right of action for holders. Section 1402(a), which 
deals with face-to-face transactions, makes a violator of section 130l(a) 
(1) or 1303(a) liable only to "his buyer or seller." In cases involving 
a market transaction, section 1402(b) provides that a defendant is 
liable only "to a person who buys or sells" between the day when he 
buys or sells and the day when all material facts become generally 
available.107 
At first blush the Code seems to codify the Birnbaum standing 
requirement. Section 1423(a), however, gives courts the power to 
recognize private actions for violations of Code provisions, even 
though such actions are not expressly created by part XIV, as long as 
any new action is not inconsistent with any conditions or restrictions 
expressly created by the Code.108 This section leaves the "outer 
103. 490 F.2d at 661. 
104. 490 F.2d at 661. 
105. For the complete text of section 1301(a) see note 70 supra, The definition of 
deceptive act includes "inaction or silence when there is a duty to act or speak," ALI 
FEDERAL SECURITIES CoDE § 225(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973), and the definition 
of misrepresentation includes "an omission to state a material fact," ALI FEDEML 
SECURITIES CoDE § 259(a){2) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973). 
106. The "fact of special significance" formulation imposes a strict standard for 
the materiality of the withheld information. See note 29 supra. 
107. A private right of action is also given to buyers or sellers in the provisions for 
liability for false registration statements, offering statements, and reports (section 
1403(c)); false filings generally (section 1404(c)); false distribution statements (section 
1405); and false publicity (section 1406(a)). 
108. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1423(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973): 
A court may recognize a private action based on a violation of a provision of 
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frontiers" of rule IOb-5 to judicial development. Comment (5) to 
section 1423(a) makes it clear that the drafters intended to allow 
courts to transcend Birnbaum by specifically mentioning that 
nothing in the Code is inconsistent with holding that purchaser-
seller status is unnecessary if only injunctive relief is sought, that a 
corporation in a merger not yet consummated is a purchaser, or that 
only the corporation need be a purchaser in a derivative suit. In 
Comment (5)(b) the Code's intent is made even more explicit: "The 
courts are free to grant standing to persons who have been affirma-
tively induced not to sell." 
Section 1423 may give rise to troublesome questions of uni-
formity. Does the Code suggest that district courts have the discretion 
to overrule the opinions of their courts of appeals on matters of 
standing? It would be anomalous for a district court to reject the 
Birnbaum doctrine after it had been expressly upheld by the court of 
appeals of the circuit. It would seem equally anomalous for the cir-
cuits to refuse to follow the lead of the Supreme Court if it chose to 
resolve the standing issue. Presumably, then, the Code simply con-
templates judicial development similar to that occurring now: The 
circuits would experiment among themselves, subject to the occa-
sional intervention of the Supreme Court. In any event, section 1423 
would make it more difficult to argue that the need for national con-
sistency requires the application of Birnbaum, as was urged but re-
jected in Eason.109 
The Code also codifies some of the holdings that have expanded 
the meaning of "sale."110 Section 293(£)(3) of Tentative Draft No. 1 
includes within the definition of "sale" "the issuance of a security 
pursuant to a merger, consolidation, recapitalization, or transfer of 
assets for securities." Comment (2) to sections 1402(a)-(c) makes it 
clear that "[a] short form merger involves a 'purchase' from the 
minority," thus incorporating the holding of Vine v. Beneficial 
Finance Co. 111 In general, however, the B~rnbaum standing require-
this Code or a rule or order thereunder (other than a rule of a national securities 
exchange or registered securities association or a rule under [Sec. Ex. Act § 15(b) 
(10)]) even though it is not expressly created by part XIV, but only_ if (1) it j.~ 
not inconsistent with the conditions or restrictions in any of the actions expressly 
created, (2) the provision, rule, or order is intended to protect a clas~ of p_!!rsons 
to which the plaintiff belongs against the kind of harm alleged, (3)_ the plaintiff 
satisfies the court that under the circumstances the remedy sought and the 
deterrent effect of recognizing the action would not be disproportionate to the 
violation, and (4) in cases comparable to those dealt with in section 1402(f)(2)(B) 
or 1403(g)(2), any section incorporating either of those sections by reference, or 
section 1408(d) a comparable limit is imposed on the measure of damages. 
109. See text accompanying notes 100-04 supra. 
110. See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra. 
111. See text accompanying note 81 supra. 
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ment would be nearly as unsettled under the Code as it is under 
present Iaw.112 
III. RELIANCE 
Establishment of a causal relationship between a rule I0b-5 
violation and a plaintiff's investment decision requires proof of the 
plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's misrepresentation, or, in a case 
involving nondisclosure, proof of reliance on the belief that the 
concealed events have not occurred.113 Reliance thus provides a "but 
for" causal link114 between the defendant's ·wrongdoing and the de-
cision to engage in or refrain from the transaction connected with the 
plaintiff's economic loss, although the loss itself may have been 
caused by other factors.115 The test, as announced in List v. Fashion 
Park, Inc.,116 is "whether the plaintiff would have been influenced to 
act differently than he did act if the defendant had disclosed to him 
the undisclosed fact."117 As applied to the Penn Central litigation, 
this test would allow only those shareholders able to prove individual 
reliance on the defendant's misleading conduct to recover under rule 
IOb-5.118 Each purchaser would have to prove that he would have 
refrained from buying if he had known the truth. In addition, as-
suming that the Birnbaum standing requirement were discarded,110 
112, There is one area in which the Code expressly e.xtends a private remedy to 
nontraders. Under section 1408(e), a person who violates section 1308 (dealing with 
unlawful manipulation of stock prices) or section 1309 (dealing with unlawful stabiliza-
tion) "is liable to any person other than a buyer or seller of the security involved for 
any loss caused by the violation." The comment to section 1408 says that the provision 
is intended for the case "where an unsuccessful takeover bidder [proves] that the 
defendants ••• thwarted its bid by manipulating the market." 
113. See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970); 
Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 267 (1st Cir. 1966); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F,2d 
781, 785-86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 
F.2d 457, 462-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1341-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 
(D.N.J. 1955). 
114. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1-167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970). 
115. See text accompanying note; 145-53 infra. 
116. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). 
117. 340 F.2d at 463. . 
118. Judge Lord reserved judgment as to whether proof of reliance will be required 
in the Penn Central case. He permitted the suits to continue as a class action, Proof 
of individual reliance was to be postponed until after the court had dealt with the 
elements amenable to proof in a class action. 347 F. Supp. at 1344-45. 
119. There is some indication that, where nontrading shareholders can offer the 
proof of reliance described above, courts may be willing to discard the strict standing 
requirement of Birnbaum in favor of a causation-of-investment-decision approacl1 in 
damage as well as injunction cases. In Neuman v. Electronic Specialty Co., [1969-1970 
Transfer Binder] CCH Fm. SEC. L. REP. ,r 92,591 (N.D. III. 1969), the court held that a 
cause of action was stated under rule lOb-5 by nontrading shareholders of a corporate 
defendant that allegedly had made misrepresentations with the knowledge and ap• 
proval of certain individual defendants. The representations were calculated to en• 
courage the plaintiff-shareholders to refuse an advantageous tender offer, thereby allow-
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each holder of Penn Central stock would have to prove that he would 
have closed out his holdings if he had known the truth. 
The Supreme Court, however, may have modified the proof 
standard under the reliance requirement in a way that could expand 
the class of potential plaintiffs in a given suit. In Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States120 the Court rejected the necessity of proof 
of individual reliance. It held instead that "[a]ll that is necessary is 
that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a reasonable 
investor might have considered them important in the making of 
[his] decision [to sell]."121 The facts of the case, however, must be 
examined. They may be so unique that more conventional rule 
IOb-5 actions, such as the Penn Central litigation, must be distin-
guished.122 
The plaintiffs in Affiliated Ute Citizens were individual mixed-
blood Ute Indians who had sold to non-Indians their shares in the 
Ute Development Corporation (UDC), a corporation formed to dis-
tribute to mixed-bloods their share of tribal assets, including gas, oil, 
and mineral rights and unadjudicated and unliquidated claims 
against the United States. Each shareholder's right to dispose of his 
stock was subject to first-refusal rights possessed by all members of the 
tribe. UDC appointed the First Security Bank of Utah as its transfer 
agent to hold the UDC stock for the shareholders and to issue 
dividends to them. UDC's attorney specifically instructed the bank 
to discourage the sale of stock by any shareholders.123 In adjudicating 
a rule IOb-5 claim against employees of the bank, the district court 
found that the defendants purchased and encouraged the sale of UDC 
ing the individual defendants to take full advantage of the offer themselves. Although 
the plaintiffs had allegedly suffered a loss when the market price of the stock dropped 
upon the termination of the offer, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claim 
should be dismissed because they had not actually purchased or sold, but had merely 
failed to sell. The court agreed with the defendants that allowing a nontrading share-
holder to maintain a private damage suit might in many cases permit such a shareholder 
to file a claim for damages that resulted from "his own decision not to accept the offer 
rather than any misdeeds of the defendants." [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEc. L. REP. ,i 92,591, at 98,703. However, the court noted that this danger could be 
avoided by requiring the plaintiff to prove that his reliance on the alleged misrepre-
sentation caused him to refuse to tender. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. 
L. REP. ,I 92,591, at 98,703. When the plaintiffs in Neuman discovered the misrepresenta-
tions they made telegraphic tenders, which were unacceptable to the offeree. The 
court indicated that the plaintiffs' actions evidenced their intent to sell but for the 
misrepresentations. This result is eminently fair; the alleged misrepresentations in 
Neuman were designed to cause retention, and only nontrading shareholders could 
have been injured. 
120. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
121. 406 U.S. at 153-54. 
122. See Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 124 n.12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 857 (1973). In Cohen the court declined to hold that it was error for the trial 
court not to have given jury instructions according to the Ute formulation. 
123. 406 U.S. at 145-46. 
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shares without disclosing that they were creating a secondary market 
for UDC shares among non-Indians and that the price of the stock in 
the secondary market was higher than that received by the Indians. 
The employees purchased shares for themselves and received com-
missions and gratuities, as well as increased deposits, in return for 
their facilitation of sales to non-Indians.124 The court found that the 
defendants had violated rule lOb-5. 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs on 
the ground that there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had relied 
on the representations of the bank's employees.126 The Supreme 
Court, however, accepted the trial court's view. By simply requiring 
"that the facts withheld be material"126 the Court in essence sub-
merged the reliance requirement into the definition of materiality. 
The concealment of a fact is apparently deemed to be the cause of a 
plaintiff's investment decision if the fact is material in that its dis-
closure could have been expected to influence the decision of a rea-
sonable investor. 
One-distinguishing feature of Affiliated Ute Citizens, however, is 
that it involved nondisclosures. Proof of individual reliance is per-
haps still necessary in misrepresentation cases. At first glance this is 
anomalous. One would not wish to give defendants who make affirma-
tive misrepresentations an easier time in court than those who simply 
remain silent. However, since it is generally more difficult to prove 
reliance in a nondisclosure case the actual advantage to the defendant 
who makes affirmative misrepresentations is at best slight. Neverthe-
less, one case holds that Affiliated Ute Citizens "applies equally to 
actual misrepresentations,"127 although most courts have applied it 
only to nondisclosures.128 
Another distinguishing feature of Affiliated Ute Citizens is that 
it was not a class action. Potential recovery was limited, perhaps 
making it feasible to weaken the reliance requirement. On the other 
hand, insisting on proof of personal reliance in large class actions may 
make the class action device unworkable. This concern has led at 
least one court to loosen the reliance requirement in such a case. 
When the defendants in In re Memorex Security Cases129 estimated 
124. 406 U.S. at 146-47. 
125. Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970), revd. sub nom. 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
126. 406 U.S. at 153. See text accompanying note 121 supra. 
127. Goldstein v. Regal Crest, Inc., 59 F.R.D. 396, 401 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1, 270-71. Compare Gordon v. Durr, 
366 F. Supp. 156, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1973): "Affiliated Ute Citizens thus appears to leave 
open the question of the existence of a reliance requirement where the gravamen of 
the offense is misrepresentation rather than nondisclosure." 
128. See cases cited in note 134 infra. 
129. 61 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1973). 
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that the trial would take sixty years to complete if they were given 
the right to depose and cross-examine each of the 60,000 class mem-
bers,130 the court concluded that in deciding the reliance question it 
was also "deciding the larger question of whether Rule 23(b)(3) is 
available in an action alleging securities fraud in the stock exchange 
context."131 The court adopted a "causal nexus" test for reliance, 
stating: 
If it is demonstrated that the Memorex. documents materially mis-
represented the financial status of the corporation and that the 
market responded thereto in a manner that the stock can be said to 
have been "inflated," and that it was reasonable for an investor to 
rely thereon, then a sufficient showing of a causal connection between 
the misrepresentations and the purchases by class members will have 
been made.182 
The general view seems to be that the requirement that reliance 
be proved, even if still insisted upon, ·will not defeat a class action, 
although separate trials perhaps may be necessary at some point.133 
The third distinguishing feature of Affiliated Ute Citizens is 
that the misrepresentations were made directly to the plaintiffs. In 
face-to-face situations relaxation of the reliance requirement may be 
unobjectionable. It is clear that the plaintiffs would have known 
the true facts if they had been revealed, and one can reasonably as-
sume that the plaintiffs then would have insisted on the higher re-
turn available in the secondary market. The Penn Central situation 
presents a different case. Not all investors in the open market are 
aware of or comprehend the importance of a given disclosure; some 
investors are more alert to financial news and better able to analyze 
factual material than others. Thus, it is not reasonable to assume that 
a failure to disclose material information would be the cause-in-fact 
of a decision to sell, purchase, or retain made by an uninformed or 
unsophisticated investor. 
Most courts, however, appear unwilling to limit Affiliated Ute 
Citizens to the face-to-face situation.134 Indeed, one case has expressly 
130. 61 F.R.D. at 97 n.7. 
131. 61 F.R.D. at 98. 
132. 61 F.R.D. at 101. See also Siegel v. Realty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 420, 425 
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
133, See, e.g., Brandt v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. 
L. REP.~ 94,138, at 94,585 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1973); Entin v. Barg, 60 F.R.D. 108, 112-13 
(E.D. Pa. 1973). See also note 118 supra. But see Pearson v. Ecological Science Corp., 
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED, SEc. L. REP. ~ 94,030 (S.D. Fla. March 13, 1973), in 
which positive misstatements were alleged and the question of reliance was considered 
"a highly individual question," CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 94,030, at 94,144, that con-
tributed to the denial of class action status. 
134. E.g., Sirota v. Econo-Car Intl., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Jenkins 
v. Fidelity Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391, 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler 
&: Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ~ 94,133, at 94,542 (C.D. 
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rejected the argument that Affiliated Ute Citizens is distinguishable 
from a case involving transactions on the open market, holding that 
application of the Affiliated Ute Citizens causation rule "is depen-
dent not upon the character of the transaction-face-to-face versus 
national securities exchange-but rather upon whether the defendant 
is obligated to disclose the inside information."136 Although limiting 
the relaxation of the reliance requirement to face-to-face transactions 
would protect defendants from exorbitant liability, the courts seem 
unwilling to draw this line. 
If the courts abandon proof of reliance as an element of the 
plaintiffs case, a question remains whether the defendant can assume 
the burden and prove that the plaintiff did not actually rely on the 
misrepresentation. The holding of the Second Circuit in Chris-Graft 
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.136 that proof of materiality 
raises a "presumption" that the plaintiff relied on the deception137 
imposes on a defendant the burden of proving that the plaintiff 
would not have learned of the material facts or appreciated their 
significance even if disclosure had been made.138 This interpretation 
has gained acceptance in the Third139 and Fifth Circuits.140 
The proposed Federal Securities Code continues the trend away 
from a reliance requirement, insisting instead upon proof of causa-
tion of loss (legal cause). The emphasis is not on the causal connec-
tion between the fraudulent deception and the plaintiff's investment 
decision. Instead, the Code emphasizes the causal link between the 
defendant's conduct and the plaintiffs loss. Professor Loss explains 
the difference: 
A buyer can have relied on a seller's misstatement of a material fact 
in deciding to buy; but, if the general market drops precipitately 
the next day on news of a political assassination or an invasion in 
some part of the world, the buyer's loss is caused not by the misstate-
Cal. Sept. 4, 1973). But cf. Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 124 n,12 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973), holding that failure to give jury instructions 
according to the Ute formulation is not error. 
135. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: Smith, Inc., [1973-1974 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1[ 94,473, at 95,644. See also Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec-
tronics Corp., 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), holding that "[dJemonstrating 
reliance in open market situations ••• should not be necessary." 
136. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). 
137. 480 F.2d at 373-75. It should be noted that Chris-Craft arose under section 14(e) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). 
138. Judge Gurfein argued in his partial concurrence that the rationale behind the 
reduced reliance standard was the elimination of the impractical task of discovering 
"how many votes or decisions to tender were affected." In his view materiality implies 
reliance as a matter of law, rather than merely raising a presumption. 480 F.2d at 400. 
139. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (1974). 
140. Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884 (1978), 
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ment (except in the "but for" or post hoc propter hoc sense) but by 
the disastrous political news.141 
Proof of inducement of an investment decision thus has no gen-
eral significance as a separate element in antifraud actions under the 
Code. One exception is found in section 1403(d)(l), which disallows 
the defense of correction to a defendant guilty of filing a false 
registration statement, offering statement, or annual report if the 
plaintiff "justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission."142 
Comment (8)(b) to section 1403 indicates that the List definition of 
reliance is intended.143 The Affiliated Ute Citizens formulation-that 
materiality proves reliance-would make section 1403(d)(l) sur-
plusage, because materiality is already required for a section 1403 
violation. Section 1404(d), which deals ·with other false filings, also 
requires proof of reliance. 
A reliance requirement of sorts also appears in section 256(b), 
which elaborates on the definition of materiality in the face-to-face 
situation: "When a person is communicating ·with a small number of 
other persons, ... (2) a fact is not 'material,' notwithstanding section 
256(a), with regard to a recipient of the communication who is 
known by the maker of the communication not to regard or to be 
likely to regard the fact as important in determining his course of 
action although a reasonable investor would so regard it." This is 
similar to a reliance requirement because it focuses on the causal 
link between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's investment 
decision. Whereas Affiliated Ute Citizens found reliance from ma-
teriality, however, the Code equates nonreliance with nonmateriality 
in face-to-face situations. Ironically, under present law reliance may 
be less significant in face-to-face situations than in market transac-
tions, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens.144 
IV. CAusATION OF Loss 
"Reliance" establishes a causal connection benV"een the deception 
and the plaintiff's investment decision. Another causal connection-
ben\Teen the actions of the defendant that induced the investment 
141. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 215A, Comment (4)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
March 1973) (emphasis original). 
142. At present such situations arise under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 
15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). 
143. Section 1403(d)(2) states: "Reliance on an omission is proved by proof of re-
liance on the particular filing or document and ignorance of the omission; but reliance 
on either a misrepresentation or an omission may be proved without proof that the 
plaintiff read a particular filing or document." The Comment observes: "If reliance is 
to be required at all ••• the text langnage, which comes from List, seems sound." 
144. See text following note 133 supra. 
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decision and the plaintiff's loss-may be required by section 28(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides that "no person 
permitted to maintain a suit for damages under [the Act] ... shall 
recover ... a total amount in excess of his actual damages on account 
of the act complained of."145 Section 28(a) bars recovery by plaintiffs 
who would not have avoided economic loss even if the defendants had 
been completely candid. 
Such a causation requirement is well conceived; it approximates 
the results achieved by the Birnbaum standing rule without incor-
porating the latter's weaknesses. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco140 
illustrates the effect of the causation requirement. A corporation's 
minority shareholders charged that the controlling shareholders had 
manipulated the market price of the corporation's stock by reducing 
dividends in order to acquire shares at a depressed price. The Second 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action for injunctive 
relief under rule IOb-5, even though they did not satisfy the Birn-
baum standing requirement because they had purchased their stock 
before the defendant's ·wrongdoing and had not yet sold it at the time 
of the suit. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's damages 
claims, however, because "[o]n this aspect of the case, the only trans-
actions in securities that plaintiffs could refer to would be defendants' 
purchases of stock from other ... shareholders at depressed prices; 
. . . the causal connection between these and any alleged existing 
damage to plaintiffs is slim indeed."147 The court observed that while 
the claim for damages was deficient with regard to "proof of loss and 
the causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule; ... the 
claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these issues .... "148 
This observation is important. In Genesco the market price of 
the plaintiffs' stock presumably rose to its original level once the de-
ception was exposed, so that the stockholders who retained their stock 
suffered no actual damage. Only those who already sold their stock 
at artificially depressed prices could prove permanent damage. In-
junctive relief, however, was properly granted. Stockholders who re-
tain their shares certainly have an interest in preventing future 
manipulations.149 
The effect of the causation requirement in Genesco was to bar 
from recovery those plaintiffs who merely retained their shares, the 
same result that would have been obtained under Birnbaum. Under 
the Birnbaum rule, however, defrauded investors who retain de-
145. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970). 
146. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); accord, Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436-37 
(6th Cir. 1969). See also Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1971). 
147. 384 F.2d at 546. 
148. 384 F..2d at 547. 
149. 384 F.2d at 547. 
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valued securities up to the time of suit are denied standing,150 but 
those who sell their securities upon discovering the fraud can sue,151 
even though the investment loss in both cases is caused by a decision 
to retain stock in reliance on a misrepresentation. Thus, Birnbaum 
makes a distinction between two investors who suffer an identical 
drop in the value of their stock as its price hits bottom. 
Since an investor may be injured as much by a decision to retain 
securities as by a decision to sell or purchase, the requirement that 
plaintiffs sell at some time before bringing suit is unreasonable. 
One may, however, in some circumstances make a valid distinc-
tion between purchasers or sellers and mere holders of stock by 
focusing on the causal connection between the fraudulently induced 
investment decision and the plaintiff's damages. Purchasers and 
sellers are more likely to be able to prove causation. For example, if 
an insider is to trade without violating rule IOb-5 he must disclose 
all material facts and allow time for their assimilation by the pub-
lic.162 If he discloses discouraging information, the market price of 
the securities involved will drop, indirectly communicating the in-
formation to even the least alert members of the investing public. 
N onshareholders would refrain from purchasing or would purchase 
at prices reflecting the stock's true value. "But for" the withholding 
of material information, purchasers injured by a nondisclosure would 
not have purchased, or at least would have paid a fair price, and 
would have sustained no economic loss. 
Mere "holders," who purchased their stock before occurrence of 
the concealed events, occupy a different position. Many would have 
suffered at least some loss even if the· insider had made a complete 
and immediate disclosure, for the price of their shares would have 
fallen as soon as the adverse information was released, and most 
sales would thus be made at depressed prices. 
If a shareholder planned to sell while he and most other share-
holders were ignorant of facts that foretold a decline in the market 
value of the stock, but he is dissuaded from selling because an in-
sider makes affirmative misrepresentations, a causal connection would 
exist both between the misrepresentation and the decision not to 
sell and between the retention of the stock and the economic loss. 
Accordingly, a requirement that a plaintiff who merely held stock 
demonstrate that but for the misrepresentation he would have sold 
while other investors held might seem appropriate.153 
150. Morrow v. Schapiro, 334 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Mo. 1971). _ 
151. Feldbcrg v. O'Connell, 338 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1972); Silverman v. Bear, 
Stearns &: Co., 331 F. Supp. 1334 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Stockwell v. Reynolds &: Co., 252 F. 
Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
152. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853-54 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
153. Stockwell v. Reynolds &: Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), may have been 
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Although this rule might work where the misrepresentation 
occurs in a face-to-face ~ituation, it would present insurmountable 
proof problems where the misrepresentations are directed to the 
general public. In a case like Penn Central, the complete conceal-
went of the company's weakened financial condition equalizes the 
market awareness of outside shareholders; sophisticated analysts are 
as ignorant as na'ive investors. The former might justly claim that 
they could have saved themselves if the facts had been revealed as 
soon as they became known to the insiders. But it seems impossible 
after the fact to separate those who might have saved themselves from 
their less alert brethren. Therefore the proof problem described 
above remains: If the truth were made known to the public the price 
would drop whether the disclosure was made sooner or later, and all 
holders would suffer loss. Because mere holders cannot sustain the 
burden of proof with regard to causation, they should be denied 
recovery under rule IOb-5. 
It may appear that this approach merely reinstates the Birnbaum 
standing requirement criticized at length above.164 However, an 
analysis based on causation limits the plaintiff class in a way that is 
both more analytically precise and more flexible, allowing for re-
covery in cases in which misrepresentations are personally addressed 
to a few investors who can prove that they might have traded while 
others held. 
The Federal Securities Code adopts a different approach. It be-
gins by defining causation in section 215A: "A loss is 'caused' by 
specified conduct to the extent that the conduct (a) was a substantial 
factor in producing the loss and (b) might reasonably have been 
expected to result in loss of the kind suffered." "But for" causation 
does not suffice under this definition. The comments give the ex-
ample of a market decline after the published rectification of a false 
earnings statement that was used in the sale of an electronics stock. 
A buyer of the stock may satisfy clause (a) ("but for" causation de-
fined in "substantial factor" terms) but would not satisfy clause (b) 
("legal cause") to the extent that the market slide resulted from an 
unconnected event, such as "the sudden death of the corporation's 
president or a softening of the market in all electronics stocks."16G 
Part XIV of the Code defines the situations in which causation is 
relevant to civil liability. The causation requirement for section 
1402(b), which creates liability for market transactions violating 
such a case. The court refused to dismiss the claims of investors who alleged that 
they were dissuaded from selling stock by their broker's misrepresentations as to the 
issuer's financial health. 
154. See text following note 72 supra. 
155. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CoDE § 215A, Comment (4)(b) (Tent, Draft No, 2, 
March 1973). 
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sections 1301(a)(l)156 or 1303(a),157 is found in section 1402(£)(2). 
That section imposes the burden of proving lack of causation on the 
defendant: "For purposes of section 1402(b), the measure of damages 
... is (A) reduced to the extent (which may be complete) that the 
defendant proves that the violation did not cause the loss."158 The 
comments label this concept "comparative causation."159 If the in-
siders cannot disprove causation, the measure of damages will be that 
prescribed by section 1402(£)(1).16° For a buyer of Penn Central stock, 
for instance, damages would be the difference between the purchase 
price and the value of the securities at the time all of the previously 
undisclosed facts became available. 
Section 1402(£)(2)(B) mitigates the potential harshness of the 
shift in the causation burden by placing a ceiling on liability. By 
limiting damages "to the extent of the securities that the defendant 
sold or bought" the provision protects insider-traders from civil 
156. Section 130l(a)(l) is set out in note 70 supra. 
157. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1303(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973): 
It is unlawful for an insider to sell, buy, or induce the holding of a security 
of the issuer, if he knows a fact of special significance with respect to the issuer 
or the security that is not generally available, unless (1) the insider believes, and 
has reasonable ground to believe, that the fact is generally available or (2), if the 
buyer, seller, or holder (or his agent in the transaction) is identified, (A) the in-
sider believes, and has reasonable ground to believe, that that person knows it, or 
(B) that person in fact knows it from the insider or otherwise. 
158. Lack of causation is also a defense or a mitigating factor in § 1403(g)(l)(A) 
(false registration statements, etc.), § 1404(e) (false filings generally), § 1405 (false pub-
licity), and § 1408(c)(l) (manipulation and stabilization). 
159. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1402(f)(2), Comment (1) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
March 1973). 
160. AU FEDERAL SECURITIES CoDE § 1402(f)(l) (Tent. Draft No. 2, March 1973): 
The measure of damages (subject to the limitations in paragraph (2)) is 
(A), if the plaintiff is a buyer, the difference between the amount that he paid 
and the value of the security determined as of the time specified in section 
1402(e)(l) [the time all material facts became generally available], except that 
(i), to the extent that the plaintiff sold a security of the class and series after 
his purchase and before the time specified in section 1402(e}(l) realizing less than 
he paid, "measure of damages" means the difference between the amount that 
he paid and the amount that he received on sale, and 
(ii), to the extent that the defendant bought a security of the class and series 
after his sale on which the action is based and before the time specified in sec-
tion 1402(e)(l) at a profit (compared with his sale price to the plaintiff) greater 
than the measure of damages as defined in the foregoing portion of this sub-
paragraph (A), "measure of damages" means that profit; and 
(B), if the plaintiff is a seller, the difference between the amount that he re-
ceived and the value of the security, determined as of the time specified in section 
1402(e)(l}, except that 
(i), to the extent that the plaintiff bought a security of the class and series 
after his sale and before the time specified in section 1402(e)(l), paying more 
than he received, "measure of damages" means the difference between the amount 
that he paid on purchase and the amount that he received, and 
(ii), to the extent that the defendant sold a security of the class and series 
after his purchase on which the action is based and before the time specified in 
section 1402(e)(l) at a profit (compared with his purchase price from the plaintiff) 
greater than the measure of damages as defined in the foregoing portion of this 
subparagraph (B), "measure of damages" means that profit. 
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liabilities grossly out of proportion to their gain.161 Thus a Penn 
Central insider who sold 1,000 shares immediately before the market 
dropped 80 points would be liable at most for $80,000 (1,000 shares 
X $80 per share).162 
As discussed above,163 however, section 1402 expressly creates a 
right of action only in buyers and sellers. Mere holders of securities 
must depend on a judicially created action under section 1423(a).164 
If a court does use section 1423(a), a question may arise whether the 
shift in burden of proof and the damage limitations of section 1402 
apply. Since the new action would still be based on violation of the 
insider trading restrictions of section 1303(a), arguably the damage 
and causation rules of section 1402 are grafted onto the new action. 
This would be true at least with respect to the damage ceiling. 
Clause (4) of section 1423(a) allows a new action only if "in cases 
comparable to those dealt with in section 1402(f)(2)(B) ... a com-
parable limit is imposed on the measure of damages." Whether a 
court may shift the burden of proving causation back to the plaintiffs 
to compensate for extending standing to mere holders, however, is 
less clear. Section 1423(a) provides that a new action may be recog-
nized only if "the plaintiff satisfies the court that under the circum-
stances the remedy sought and the deterrent effect of recognizing the 
action would not be disproportionate to the violation." This clause 
supports the view that the court can adjust the elements of the action. 
It expresses a concern that the remedy be commensurate with the 
violation, and the court may feel that the remedy would be dispro-
portionate unless the burden of proving causation is on the plaintiff. 
Section 1423(a) allows recognition of a new action only "if it is 
not inconsistent with the conditions or restrictions in any of the 
actions expressly created." A plaintiff may thus argue that the burden 
of causation must be left with the defendant, as required by section 
1402(f)(2)(A). However, the effect of section 1423(a) would be very 
limited by so narrow a construction of "inconsistent." The better 
interpretation is simply that a court may not, on the pretense of 
recognizing a new action, refuse to enforce restrictions expressly 
created by the Code. Thus, the example of an inconsistent action 
given in the commentsrn5 is one that allows a market buyer to recover 
for negligently false reports or press releases even though sections 
161. Such protection is not afforded under present law. See text accompanying notes 
16-18 supra. 
162. Defendants are also protected by the artificial ceiling on damages discussed at 
text following note 44 supra. 
163. See text preceding note 107 supra. 
164. Section 1423(a) is set out in note 108 supra. 
165. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1423(a), Comment (4)(a) (Tent, Draft No. 2, 
March 1973). 
June 1974] Notes 1429 
1404 and 1406 require scienter in such cases. Such an action would 
be little more than the nullification of a statutory provision.166 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although under present law the causation of loss requirement 
may distinguish rationally among plaintiffs, the potential scope of 
the plaintiff class when a large, publicly held corporation is involved 
would still be vast, especially if Affiliated Ute Citizens is followed 
literally. This may indicate that a private compensatory remedy is an 
unworkable sanction for violations of rule IOb-5. 
Moreover, private compensatory remedies do not further the 
goals of section l0(b) and rule l0b-5. Both are essentially prohibitory 
and designed to maintain an atmosphere of fair dealing in the securi-
ties marketplace. They do not demand disclosure of material facts 
when concealment serves a corporate purpose; rather, they demand 
that those who conceal confidential corporate information refrain 
from trading.167 It is the insider's concealment, however, and not 
his trading that causes the losses suffered by other investors.168 The 
insider's trading on the basis of confidential information causes 
damage only to those with whom he is directly in privity, and that 
relationship is purely fortuitous. The defendant's real offense is his 
abuse of the market. By using private information for personal gain 
·wrongdoers decrease public confidence in the securities market and 
discourage potential investors.169 
In short, the primary thrust of rule IOb-5 should be the deter-
rence of insider misconduct, rather than compensation of investors. 
A variety of noncompensatory sanctions exist through which deter-
rence can be achieved, including SEC investigations and criminal 
sanctions.170 Perhaps the best solution is to deprive wrongdoers of 
166. Similar problems may arise if section 1423(a) is used to create a private action 
for plaintiffs induced to hold their securities by the defendant's misrepresentations in 
a face-to-face transaction. Section 1402(a), which creates a remedy for purchasers and 
sellers who are misled in nonmarket transactions, does not contain a damage ceiling 
and does not shift the burden of proof of causation to the defendant. Whether a court 
could impose a ceiling or shift the burden under section 1423(a) is unclear. 
167. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
168. Comment, SEC Enforcement of the Rule lOb-5 Duty To Disclose Material 
Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. REv. 944, 960 
(1967). 
169. The Penn Central case lends no support to Professor Manne's much-discussed 
suggestion that insiders be permitted to trade on the basis of confidential information 
as a reward for entreprenurial services. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING /\ND THE STOCK 
MARKET 138-41, 147-89 (1966). Insider trading in the Penn Central context would reward 
not the innovative but the inept who presided over the collapse of the enterprise. 
170. See note 15 supra. 
This does not mean that private investors must be left at the mercy of insiders. 
1430 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 72:1898 
their unjust enrichment through either an SEC restitutionary ac-
tion171 or a simple private derivative suit.172 Criminal sanctions173 
and punitive damages174 could be imposed in egregious cases, ensur-
ing that the insider will always be left with something to lose by at-
tempting fraud. These options would provide a flexibility not now 
available in compensatory damage cases. 
The proposed Federal Securities Code does not limit the possi-
bility of vast insider liability by narrowing the plaintiff class. Instead, 
it places a ceiling on the damages each defendant must pay. Such a 
scheme is itself an indication that full compensation of investors 
injured in open market situations is unfeasible and of secondary 
importance; the recoveries of individual plaintiffs are likely to be 
insignificant. · 
Damage and restitutionary remedies are available when a plaintiff can prove that he was 
the victim of a common law fraud in his dealings with a corporate insider. The plaintiff, 
however, must show that he was damaged by his justifiable reliance on a material 
misrepresentation made with intent to deceive by one who knew of the falsity. See 
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105, 107-08 (4th ed. 1971). He may not 
have a cause of action if he relied on nondisclosure rather than affirmative misrepre• 
sentation. See note 12 supra. But see W. PROSSER, supra, § 106, at 996-99. 
A rescission action grounded in federal law is also a possibility. The Securities Ex-
change Act expressly provides in section 29(b) that contracts made in violation of the 
Act or any rule of the Commission thereunder shall be void as regards the rights of 
any violator or of persons who acquired rights under the contract knowing of the facts 
resulting in the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970). (Section 1423(b) of the Code is 
to the same effect.) Section 29(b) contemplates rescission of the contract and restitution 
of the injured party's consideration. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 
514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (alternative holding); Geismar v. :Bond &: Goodwin, Inc., 40 F. 
Supp. 876, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). Kardon and Geismar involved suits by defrauded sellers. 
The voidability provision would seem by definition to apply only when privity of 
contract exists between the litigants. See 3 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 1759 (2d ed, 1961), 
This, coupled with a short statute of limitations (suit must be brought within one 
year after discovery that the violation was involved in the sale and within three years 
of the violation), may make the section less attractive to plaintiffs than the implied 
private remedy under rule lOb-5. 
Rescission has also been granted under the general equitable powers of courts under 
section 22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970). See Deckert v. In• 
dependence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 288-89 (1940) (suit by a buyer induced to pur• 
chase by violation of the 1933 Act). Such a remedy may avoid the statute of limitations 
problem, but privity of contract probably would still be required. 
171. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 1005 (1971). 
172. In Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.l?d 78 
(1969), the state court sustained the sufficiency of a derivative suit complaint that 
sought to recover profits made by insiders trading on the basis of confidential cor• 
porate information. The corporate officers allegedly sold their personal holdings with-
out disclosing an approaching drastic reduction in the company's earnings. The court 
saw no merit in the argument that the corporation could not complain because it had 
suffered no direct damage. 24 N.Y.2d at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. 
See also Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 42 U.S.L.W. 4603 (U.S. 
April 29, 1974). 
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1970). See note 15 supra. 
174. See Note, Securities Regulations-Damages-The Possibility of Punitive Dam• 
ages as a Remedy for a Violation of Rule J0b-5, 68 Mica. L. REV, 1608 (1970). 
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Moreover, individual plaintiffs may be bypassed completely. Sec-
tion 1409 sets up a proration mechanism to consolidate actions
against the same defendant and to spread the damages over the entire
plaintiff class. If the trial court does not feel that "the expense of
making the proration is warranted in relation to the amounts that
would be awarded to individual plaintiffs," section 1409(j) allows the
recovery to be turned over to the issuer (if it is not a defendant), pro-
vided that the action is not for a false filing or statement and an
award to the issuer would not be inequitable. Alternatively the re-
covery may be awarded to the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion.175
The theory of the scheme "is compensation if practicable but in
any event deterrence and avoidance of unjust enrichment."178 The
integrated and consistent civil liability proposals of Tentative Draft
No. 2 of the Federal Securities Code deserve serious consideration
as a method of rectifying the inequities and unrealities of present
rule lOb-5 actions. Unless similar limitations on liability are en-
acted, private federal damage remedies should be discontinued.
175. The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a nonprofit corpora-
tion established by the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-lll
(1970) (see especially 15 U.S.C. § 7ccc (1970)), to administer a fund for the protection
of customers of securities brokers and dealers on the national exchanges who are in
financial difficulty. The fund, established by 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd (1970), is comprised in
part by contributions from brokerage houses and dealerships.
176. ALI FEDERAL SEcURITES CODE § 1409, Comment (5)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
March 1973).
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